property taxes and waivers of building permit fees. Other incentives apply to different landmark property types.
This article contributes to the literature by identifying biases common in previous studies and implementing a method to correct for them. This article offers more empirical evidence on the relationship between prices and historic designation. The methodology employed here allows for more robust interpretation of the effect or impact of landmark designation. Moreover, unlike previous research, the methods used here account for spatial dependence in the data and improve inferences about the statistical significance of implicit prices of landmark characteristics. This approach informs our understanding of the neighborhood effects of historic landmarks.
Background
One rationale for historic preservation policies is that markets fail to optimally provide for preservation Rypkema, 1994) . Individual properties may contribute to the historic character of the urban environment, and this historical externality may affect the well-being of others in ways not captured by prices.
The owner of a historic hotel may add to the charm of downtown and certainly to the quality of the view from apartments across the street, yet the owner receives no compensation from those external benefits. Thus, it is argued, policies are needed to preserve those historic characteristics.
In practice, though, historic preservation may represent a very hard case for market failure-motivated policy. Unlike typical land-use spillovers such as smoke or noise, historical character might be construed as cultural or social capital. The possibility that the amount of historical preservation may affect one's value of historical 3 preservation complicates the policy questions of entitlement to unrestricted property use or to neighborhood stability. The irreversibility of alterations to historical character complicates matters still further.
In Chicago, landmarks can be designated for many reasons. The many purposes of the landmarks ordinance include preserving and rehabilitating aspects of the built environment with special significance (Commission on Chicago Landmarks, 2006). It explicitly aims to preserve neighborhood character, promote economic development and an expanded property tax base, prevent urban blight and reverse deterioration, and cultivate civic pride. Potential landmarks are evaluated based on several criteria concerning the historical, architectural, and aesthetic significance to the city. more than others (e.g., Schlect House, Henry Gerber House, Wingert House). Each landmark may have been designated to achieve one of more of the ordinance's objectives.
Arguably, most of these designations were intended to preserve or enhance neighborhood quality, which could then be reflected in housing prices.
Historic preservation policies can have several effects, and this article focuses its attention on those values expressed through property markets. Restrictions on property use should reduce property values, reflected in lower sale prices. Eligibility for tax deductions and other financial assistance, on the other hand, should increase property values and be reflected in higher sale prices. Landmark designation that confers honorific status may also see that symbolic value captured by higher prices. Preservation policies also provide stability to a neighborhood by limiting change, thereby reducing the investment risk for other property owners. Frequently, observers cite intangible external benefits to historic designation, such as signaling "public commitment" to an area (Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991) , solving market failure in "providing a sense of unity with the past" (Asabere & Huffman, 1994b) , strengthening the "social fabric" of a community (New York Landmarks Conservancy 1977) , and "catalyzing" rehabilitation of nearby areas Listokin, Listokin, and & Lahr, 1998; Rypkema, 1994) .
Previous Findings
Measuring these effects is an empirical matter. The scholarly literature has yielded motley results on the price effects of historical preservation policies. Leichenko, Coulson, and Listokin (2001) review empirical works in this area, showing how the "impact of designation on property values" varies across studies and across empirical methods. Several earlier studies (e.g., Benson & Klein, 1988; Gale, 1991; Scribner, 1976) use a difference-in-difference method to identify price effects of historic designation.
This method typically involves comparing sample average property value growth rates in historic and nonhistoric districts. Many other omitted factors that differ between areas 5 may be relevant and better explain differential growth rates. More recent research has employed hedonic pricing method to assess the implicit price of properties' attributes with historic designation being one of those attributes. Examples of this approach (Asabere & Huffman 1994a , 1994b Clark & Herrin, 1997; Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991) control for many other features of properties yet also find mixed results. Schaeffer and Millerick (1991) claim that some of the variation in price effects is due to differences in landmark regulation at local and national levels. Leichenko et al. (2001) control for different types of historic designation and conclude that it does matter in some areas and that price effects generally vary across cities and sources of data.
With over 2,000 local historic district commissions and thousands of diverse properties listed on the National Register, one might expect local studies to yield divergent results. Leichenko et al. (2001) find historically designated properties in Texas to have 5 to 20% higher appraised prices than other properties. Coulson and Leichenko (2001) find that local "historical designation adds about 17.6% percent to the value of a unit" (p.118) in Abilene, Texas. In Philadelphia, owner-occupied properties located in historic districts listed on the National Register sell at 26% higher prices than other properties sampled by Asabere and Huffman (1994b) . Philadelphia condominiums with historic easements, however, sell for about 30% less than comparable properties, and that price is discounted by 4.6% per year after the donation (Asabere & Huffman, 1994a) .
The empirical literature has addressed the issue of externalities from historic preservation sparingly to date. It is hypothesized that historic buildings have positive (or negative) effects on neighboring properties' prices. Coulson and Leichenko (2001) seek 6 to estimate the external impact of historic designation, using a hedonic price method that includes the number of historically designated properties in a unit's census tract as an attribute of that unit. They find that each additional historic house in a tract in Abilene,
Texas is associated with a sales price that is 0.14% higher.
There may also be public-good benefits from preservation beyond the impact on properties and nearby properties. Several authors have sought to measure those publicgood benefits of historic preservation using stated preference techniques such as contingent valuation (see, e.g., Chambers, Chambers, & Whitehead, 1998; Kling, Revier, & Sable, 2004) .
There is a temptation to conclude that higher or lower prices associated with historic landmarks are the consequence of their designation. Without a careful research design, however, this conclusion may be unwarranted. Two problems arise: omittedvariable bias and endogenous designation. Historic designation is likely correlated with other (unobserved) characteristics of the property. Higher-quality properties, those maintained better, or those in premium locations may be more likely to become designated.
3 Coulson and Lahr (2005) acknowledge this potential for omitted-variable bias in examining designation impacts. Their method, examining the difference in appreciation rates between properties in otherwise comparable (historical and non-historical) districts, stands to correct for this. Although they do find substantially higher appreciation rates for properties in locally designated historic districts, their analysis hinges critically on (a) the selection of comparison neighborhoods (done by the Memphis Landmarks Commission using undisclosed methodology), (b) appraisal rather than sales data, and (c) the absence of neighborhood-level or geographic variables common to hedonic models. This article improves on this by looking at designations occurring between sales, using repeat-sales data, and including a broader set of neighborhood and geographic variables.
Second, an endogenous designation process may complicate matters further.
Properties in areas ripe for revitalization or in "hot" areas may attract the attention of landowners and local officials who support landmark status. Thus, buildings' and neighborhoods' price levels and trends influence the likelihood of receiving landmark designation. If we think that historic designation is assigned deliberately depending on site characteristics (e.g., price) and expectations about the future (Coulson & Leichenko, 2004) , then a selection bias may limit causal interpretations of many earlier findings.
Does designating a home as historic cause its price to rise by 18%, or do high-priced (or fast-appreciating) homes become designated? The possibility of and problems arising from endogenous designation remains the subject of future research. For now, this article addresses the omitted-variable problem and robustly controls for the significant influence of unobserved quality on observed price differentials associated with landmarks.
Empirical Method Hedonic Price Method
Price effects of landmark designation are estimated using hedonic price models.
Hedonic price models are based on the theory that houses are goods with many attributes and that the marginal implicit prices for the attributes can be identified by assessing how sale prices vary with attributes. Researchers frequently use hedonic analyses to identify the marginal price of changes in location, environmental quality, and other neighborhood 8 characteristics. See Rosen (1974) and Freeman (2003) for further discussion of the method.
The first-stage of a hedonic analysis identifies implicit attribute prices. The firststage hedonic regression estimates the following general model:
where Price i is the sale price, Attributes i is a vector of attributes of a house, and ε i is an error term, all for the ith house. Equation 1 is typically estimated using a regression framework. The estimated coefficients for each attribute indicate the marginal price for that attribute.
Repeat Sales
The data in this study offer an opportunity to use a repeat-sales framework for the hedonic analysis. 4 This approach has an advantage in that it controls for time-invariant unobserved or omitted attributes. Consider a semi-log specification of the hedonic price function for a sale of the ith house in period t: 
As the time-invariant attributes drop out, the change in ln(Price) is a function of appreciation, the change in attributes, and the change in landmark status. This construction assumes that the marginal attribute price is constant over time. Equation 3 can be easily adjusted to allow for β to vary over time, however. See Kiel and Zabel (1997) for further discussion of this "hybrid model" and extensions in Clapp and Giaccomotto (1998) .
In equation 3, the estimated δ coefficient represents the implicit price associated with a change in landmark status. By estimating equation 3 instead of 2, however, δ is no longer subject to bias from omitting Invariant i variables, even unobservable ones. This can be especially important for historic landmark properties, where some intangible or unobserved property characteristics may explain its different price rather than its mere formal designation. For example, if landmark properties have higher quality construction, special or unique "historic" design features, or extra prestige associated with them, a hedonic analysis using equation 3 that omits these difficult-to-observe variables (which are constant over time) will not bias its δ estimate. In other words, historic designation will not be proxying for all of the underlying features that got the property designated in the first place. It will better capture the before-and-after price effect of designation.
The hybrid repeat-sales model from equation 3 is straightforward to estimate using OLS. Letting D it be dummy variables indicating whether house i was sold in period t, the model to estimate becomes:
The ∆D it , for t = 1,…,T, is a set of indicator variables taking a value of 1 in the year of the property's final sale, a value of -1 in the year of its first sale, and a value of zero otherwise. The θ i error term is estimated using Huber-White robust errors. This is just one way in which spatial dependence may exist in the data, and it is now often addressed in hedonic research. form, the vector of errors, θ in model (4), is specified in an SAR model as:
where µ is an independent and identically distributed vector of error terms. The parameter λ corrects for the spatial correlation in the error. Estimating equation 4 with the spatial autoregressive error via OLS involves a nonspherical error and leaves the coefficients unbiased but the standard errors both biased and inefficient. Accounting for the SAR error structure described in equation 5 can avoid these biases.
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For this analysis, the W matrix assigns a value of 1 to neighbors within ¼ mile of the sold property. 8 Otherwise, cells in W take a value of zero. Diagnostic tests for the presence of spatial dependence in the data are conducted as per Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon (1996) , clearly indicating spatial autocorrelation in the residuals from estimating equation 4 via OLS. (Siciliano, 2004) . The property and sales data come from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) records of sales of all "attached" residential property sales in the city of Chicago from 1990 to 1999. These attached properties are typically condominiums and townhouses (in contrast to detached single-family housing, or multifamily housing). There were 73,106 attached residential property sales using the MLS in Chicago during the 1990s, which accounts for a large share of all residential property sales in the city. The MLS records were sufficient to map over 71,275 of these observations, although many of these records are missing valid information. As expected, many of the properties are concentrated downtown, near Lake Michigan, and in other pockets scattered around the city.
Missing information for certain variables in the MLS data set has been dealt with as follows: Two key variables, square footage and year built, are missing from 24,835
and 27,608 observations, respectively. First, the analysis is performed using the subsample of those observations for which no information is missing. This solution discards much information and, to avoid bias, relies on the discarded observations being representative of those remaining. Because of the well-established problems with listwise deletion strategies (see, e.g., Little, 1992; Little & Rubin, 1987) , these results appear in the Appendix for comparison. Secondly, a multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) method is used to impute plausible missing values for area and year built, incorporating some randomness to capture the uncertainty in the imputations (Royston, 2005) . 10 By repeating this imputation several times, the resulting data sets are analyzed identically and their estimates pooled to obtain confidence intervals. This method has the advantages of using more information and assuming only that the probability of an observation missing a value does not depend on unobserved information.
Despite the missing information, the MLS data have several desirable features.
First, it captures actual sales and perceived attribute values of those involved in the transaction. Actual market data are superior to appraisal data in this regard, although sales data reveal prices only for properties actually sold rather than the universe of properties in a city. A selection bias is thus possible. Second, the MLS data records have information about a wide range of property attributes (e.g., list and sale price and date, 13 dimensions of various rooms, tax payments). Finally, because the sample covers nearly all sales of attached properties during a 10-year span, many properties were sold multiple times during that period. This allows for a repeat-sale approach. Table 1 contains the   variable descriptions, and Table 2 presents the sample descriptive statistics.
[Insert Tables 1 + 2 about here] Empirical Results
The first set of results is presented for the hedonic regression using all sales of attached housing in Chicago during the 1990s. This hedonic model estimates equation 2
for a large set of attributes of the properties and neighborhoods. Over 63,000
observations have complete (or estimated) information for all variables. The results of a Box-Cox regression suggested a semi-log form for the appropriate specificationconsistent with recommendations elsewhere in the hedonics literature (Cropper, Deck, & McConnell, 1988 ). 11 Table 3 shows results for three different models: Model 1 is and OLS model with no community-area effects and no spatial autocorrelation, Model 2 is an OLS model with community effects but no spatial autocorrelation, and Model 3 is a SAR model with no community effects, but it accounts for spatially autocorrelated errors. The community-area effects control for each of 77 community areas' average price levels.
Model 1 serves as the baseline for comparison. Both Models 2 and 3 represent improvements in capturing neighborhood effects over Model 1. All test statistics are reported using robust errors. The coefficients estimated using the semi-log models in Table 3 should be interpreted as percentage changes in real sales price for the property, on the margin. Thus, another room or a garage is associated with properties that sell for 3 14 to 4% more. The estimated spatial nuisance parameter λ = 0.65 in the SAR model signifies substantial positive spatial autocorrelation.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results for each model indicate a good fit to the data. The R 2 of 0.77 for Model 1 rises to 0.79 in Model 2. The estimated coefficients are typically significant at less than the 0.1% level. Each of the coefficients for property attributes and neighborhood characteristics have the expected sign. Bigger units with more rooms sell for higher prices. Prices were also higher for sales downtown and near parks and the river, not too close to Chicago Transit Authority lines and in areas with high property values, low density, fewer nonwhites, higher incomes, and older buildings. One unexpected result is the positive coefficient for distance to lake, which indicates that additional distance away from Lake Michigan is associated with a higher sales price. 12 When community-area effects are controlled for, however, distance to lake becomes a disamenity beyond 3.6
km.
The variables of interest in Table 3 , the landmark variables, tell an interesting story. Units in properties that are designated landmarks (buildings or districts) sell for a substantial premium over comparable properties (10.6% higher prices). Controlling for community areas, that premium falls to 8.9%. Those properties in landmark districts receive only a 3 to 5% premium. Controlling for community effects or for spatial dependence in the data appears to reduce the landmark premium as well as the difference in premiums between landmark buildings and districts. So far, these results are broadly consistent with much of the previous literature and conventional wisdom.
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The hedonic models in Table 3 also account for "neighbor effects" or the sale properties' proximity to other landmarks. In Model 1, each additional landmark in a block group is associated with 1.9% lower sales prices for attached homes in that block group. This contrasts with Coulson and Leichenko (2001) , whose similar approach finds that prices are higher with more landmarks nearby. Controlling for community-area effects (Model 2) or spatial dependence in the data (Model 3), however, accounts for much of this negative effect. The number of landmarks in a block group may proxy for some more general "neighborhood effect" not attributable to landmarks. Overall, the hedonic models in Table 3 show BG-landmarks to be neither an amenity nor a disamenity. Table 3 also control for characteristics of the nearest landmark. The price effect of proximity to landmarks is sensitive to different modeling assumptions about space and neighborhoods. In the models with no community effects, the price effect of distance to the nearest landmark is significantly different from zero. It becomes insignificant after controlling for community areas. Although properties that are closer to landmarks might sell at a premium, that premium increases with the time elapsed since the nearest landmarks construction or designation date. This effect may reflect that recently constructed or designated landmarks are increasingly "marginal." It might also reflect a tendency for recent landmarks to be designated in neighborhoods with depressed prices.
Models in
As noted above, care should be taken before interpreting the results in Table 3 to demonstrate that landmark designation has an "effect" or "impact" on prices. Landmarks 15 The SAR model, which controls for spatially correlated errors, but not the selectivity bias, also finds a 2% increase from designating additional landmarks in the property's block-group. Overall, there is at least some indication that property prices rose in block groups that saw more landmarks designated in them during the 1990s.
Summary and Conclusion
Historic and landmark designation can affect prices of both the designated property and neighboring properties. Much of the writing on historic preservation touts sizable gains to society as well as the property owner. Even in the absence of positive net benefits to the property owner, a sort of "taxation by regulation" approach to historical preservation might be taken. Landmark owners may lose a little property value, it is argued, but preservation is serving the broader public interest. Similar justifications are frequently proffered in environmental preservation (e.g., species, wilderness) debates.
Restrictions on property use are justified by the sizeable external benefits of preservation ). These externalities accrue from neighborhood stabilization, adding prestige or maintaining the "charm" of a neighborhood, and other alleged positive spillovers. Thus, lower prices for designated landmark may merely be the cost of achieving the external benefits from preservation. 16 Regardless, the price effects of designation are a key aspect of historic landmark policy.
Numerous studies have tried estimating price effects of historical status on the landmarks themselves and sometimes also on nearby properties. Previous studies struggle with methodological problems such as omitted variable bias and spatial dependence in the data. Both of these concerns can arise in simple hedonic models in part because of inadequate measures of neighborhood characteristics. Lacking reliable estimates of price effects, the discussion over policy impacts can generate more heat than light.
The results presented here address some of these problems and contribute new empirical evidence. An extensive MLS data set of attached home sales in the city of Chicago during the 1990s is combined with other geographic and demographic data. The simple hedonic shows, like many previous studies, landmark prices are higher. This premium is smaller if the landmark is a district rather than a building. Yet, these effects may be capturing unobserved characteristics as well. A repeat-sales approach is introduced to reduce the bias although the data limitations prevent identifying the implicit price of designation (for the designated property). The housing market captures designation's external effects (to other properties) as well, and the evidence here is more compelling. The simple hedonic, once appropriate neighborhood controls are included,
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provides only weak evidence that proximity to older landmarks is an amenity. The more robust repeat-sales estimator, on the other hand, shows stronger evidence of proximity effects such as a positive price of having more landmarks in the block group. Although these price effects may be an artifact of the sample, they provide some support for the view that landmark designation confers substantial external benefits to other properties.
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The hedonic analyses presented here account for spatial dependence in the data.
Given the intrinsically spatial nature of landmarks and the spatial clustering in designations, geographic measures like BG-landmarks and district can be susceptible to spatial correlation problems. Neighbor effects in the attached-housing market in Chicago are strong for price levels (equation 2). First-differencing can reduce some of this (timeinvariant) interdependence, yet some remains. The effect of spatial interdependence is of particular interest for landmarks, which are often touted as having powerful effects on neighborhood identity, character, and social fabric Rypkema 1994) . Prices tend to rise as more landmarks are designated nearby, yet this may represent the nonrandom designation process (e.g., designation may be drawn to booming neighborhoods, perhaps to slow development or because residents are more able to obtain designation).
Several important limitations apply to these findings. First, these findings apply to a large sample of condo and townhouse sales in Chicago during the 1990s. They may not generalize to other property types, other regions, or other periods. Extending this approach to other property types is obviously a pressing matter for future research.
Second, the repeat-sales hedonic framework here assumes constant marginal prices over time. Third, no effort is made here to model the designation of landmark status. Although this article offers more robust procedures for estimating implicit prices, the endogeneity of designation remains the biggest obstacle to assessing the causal effects of historic preservation policies. Designation is unlikely to be independent of property and neighborhood attributes, both observed and unobserved. This selection effect in the treatment of conferring landmark status makes it difficult to draw inferences about the causal role of landmark preservation policies. Even if prices changed following designation, careful research design will be needed to ascertain whether the designation followed price shocks or vice versa.
Conclusive evidence of the price effects of historic preservation programs is elusive, even for a single market. Properties in landmark buildings and districts in Chicago clearly sell for higher prices than other properties. Yet, we cannot distinguish these effects from other unobservable traits of the property that are correlated with designation status. Very little attention has been paid to controlling for these unobserved quality characteristics, a shortcoming addressed by the repeat-sales approach of this article. Doing so demonstrates the significantly higher prices associated with having more old landmarks nearby. It also highlights the limitations of making causal inferences about housing preservation policies without a better understanding of designation processes. a Contiguity defined as all observations within ¼ mile, or approx. 2 city blocks. Spatial nuisance parameter estimated as λ = 0.648. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level. these results are presented in Table 4 and Table A2 . 6 Another form of spatial dependence, often called a "spatial lag," posits that the dependent variable is endogenous or that sale prices of neighbors affect each other. This sort of contagion effect has been observed in residential property sales (e.g., Ioannides, 2003) and can also be modeled. But this approach is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Alternative spatial error models are available, of course. For example, Pace, Barry, Clapp, and Rodriguez (1998) and Gelfand, Ecker, Knight, and Sirmans (2004) 9 Different ways to estimate this model include maximum likelihood (ML) and generalized method of moments (GMM). This analysis uses the SpaceStat (Anselin, 1995) software program to estimate the spatial models. Due to computational limits and the large sample size (N ≈ 63,000), this study opts for the GMM approach. The estimation technique uses λ to find consistent estimates of β and δ but cannot make inferences about the presence of spatial dependence. 10 The imputation of "area" and "year built" relied on the other variables listed in Table 1 as well as values for: story number of unit; community area indicator; presence of a basement; presence of a basement bath; and areas of living room, kitchen, bedrooms, and dining room.
11 The Box-Cox transformation yielded a θ = 0.065. 12 In Model 1 and Model 3, lake proximity is a disamenity after controlling for the following amenities: being on the waterfront, being near lakefront parks, being near downtown, and being near any body of water. In light of these controls, the omission of community effects and variables directly measuring access to transportation, and the "attached homes" nature of the sample, this result may not be too surprising.
13 Table A1 in the Appendix presents results without imputing missing values for year built and log-area. Relative to Table 3 , the effects of landmark and district in Table A1 have similar signs but are several times larger. The effect of landmark districts, found by summing the coefficients for district and landmark, is actually smaller without imputed values. Properties in districts receive a significant premium (2.9%) only when community area effects are included. Although districts have minimal effects on prices in Table A1 , landmark buildings receive a 24 to 32% premium depending on the model. This larger premium can be accounted for in the nonrandom nature of the missing data. In this MLS data set, more expensive properties in landmark buildings are much less likely to be missing key data than other landmark properties. Thus, the landmark coefficient in Table   A1 is likely biased upwards as less-expensive landmarks are excluded.
14 Unfortunately, even in a city as large as Chicago with an extensive and vibrant historic landmarks program, only 18 attached homes were sold before and after a landmark designation during the 1990s. The effect on its own price of designating a property as a landmark cannot be identified in a repeat-sales hedonic using these data. The spillover effects on neighboring properties, on the other hand, can be. 15 The probit in the first stage indicates that many attributes of a property predict whether it will have multiple sales. Interestingly, proximity to and characteristics of the nearest landmark appear unrelated to the probability of being a repeat-sale property. If historic preservation stabilizes neighborhoods, it does not appear to affect the frequency of transactions for nearby properties in this sample. 16 In his guide for preservation advocates, Rypkema (1994) asserts "the idea that historic districts reduce property values is blatantly untrue" (p.45). Although conceding that a district may diminish a single property's value, he claims that the sum of property values will increase due to interdependencies. He also claims "not a single credible study has demonstrated that historic districts reduce property values" (p.46). Notwithstanding Schaeffer and Millerick (1991) and the evidence cited in Leichenko, Coulson, and Listokin (2001) , this paper casts doubt on Rypkema's assertions by finding some adverse effects of nearby and new landmarks.
17 There may be sizable external benefits not captured by properties, e.g., public goods values. These were found in studies like Kling, Revier, and Sable (2004) and Chambers, Chambers, and Whitehead (1998) . a Contiguity defined as all observations within ¼ mile, or approx. 2 city blocks. Spatial nuisance parameter estimated as λ = 0.648. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level. Table 4 Repeat-Sales Hedonic Models Spatial nuisance parameter estimated as λ = 0.376. Moran's I = 0.085*** (Moran, 1950) .
Robust LM(error) = 35.05 (p-value < 0.0001).
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level.
